Jerome B. Guinand v. Paul T. Walton and Thomas F. Kearns dba, Walton-Kearns : Appellants\u27 Brief by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1968
Jerome B. Guinand v. Paul T. Walton and Thomas F.
Kearns dba, Walton-Kearns : Appellants' Brief
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.Moffat, Iverson & Taylor; Attorneys for Plainitff-
RespondentHarley W. Gustin; Attorney for Appellant Paul T. Walton dba Walton-Kearns,br/>Jones,
Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough; Attorneys for Walker Bank & Trust Company as Eecutor of the
Estate of Thomas F. Kearns, Deceased
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Guinand v. Walton, No. 11153 (Utah Supreme Court, 1968).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/83
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF 'UTAH 
JEROME B. GUINAND, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs.-.: 1:1· ~ ' 
; . ' ' ', ('1 
PAUL T. W.AliTON and THOM.A'.S 
F. KEARNS dba, w ALTON- I~ . I. 
KEARNS, ' ' ' . I 
, Def emJ,wnts-.AppeUQ/Yltts. 
' \ > • ' I /I 
\' 
Case No. 11153 · 
I' ' ' ·.' 
I I 
v J • ~ ' 
r ~ , j I 
/\ 
,' .. 
i' \ '· 
APPELLANTS~ BRIEF ,·.. . .. !~ ,, .. 
: • J ' •. ' • ' ' ' '\ '. \ ·7 . :'.: •• 
Appeal from'the Judgment of tlte.ThlrdrDistrict Coud1 • •• 1 ~· \ · <·;, 
\ • I '. < (, \ ' ' 
. In and for Satt Lake Ct>:S!J U t.ah · \. ' . ~". 1" ' '1 ;, 
The Honorable Stewart M .. ·· on,}'1dg~ · .,. · · · ·1-, ~ ·! 
' I /' ,,' ~ ' •• I ' f • .... '- ·:· . .' j ' \ 
2 11958 
.... ·v· .. ---.-----·····•·••·-
·C~:OCc>rfi() Coar., Utah 
MOFFAT, IVERSON & 
TAYLOR 
1311 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah ' 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-
Respondent. 
Harley w. Gustine for ~ r' I\ - '- i 'I~ 
GUS'fIN' & ,_RICllARDS ' I I' - '. \ 
1610'Wapt~~ :aanltrftttf·di~ '. '_, ~'' ~ ~ 111 
\Sal+ Lake City Utah I' ' I, \ .·~. . • J I . 
· AttO~~ for"A~t • .·. • - 1 • 
"PaulT>Waitlm.<tba. i '· !
1 
,ii 1."· 
) .· ' . " " c ' Watton-K~a.~ . :. \ I . . I 
J; Wendell l34yles.f'or · .·. · ' : . ·- . .. ' . :\· 
JONES, WALDO, iroLBR00~ 1 ' ,'I 
\ & 1~foDQNq'(1<m~ ~ I ; , _. ' . 
800 Walker Banlt Building. 1 \ • ~~ ,-~. 
Salt r.ab City, Utah 
'' /' 
Att~ 'for Wtiiker, B(,tlnk 1> " .. --
& T'l"USt Com:pa!P,'IJ, a.8 EzecutO'I( .. '· 
of. th,e Eestate of, Th~ F. , '. ~, - · 
Kea.ms, Decesaed. _ 
. '· 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
'L'ABL1'J 0 F CON'r1£N'rt1 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE .............. . 
Page 
1 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT .. . .............. ··········-··----- 1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL. ...... .... ...... ... ............ ...... .. 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS ... ···-·-------·-------·------················-···· 2 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE SUBSTANTIVE ASPECT OF THE PAROL EVI-
DENCE RULE HAS BEEN MISAPPLIED ........... ______________ 7 
POINT IL 
THE JUDGMENT IS AT VARIANCE WITH THE 
PLEADINGS AND THE PRETRIAL ORDER. .................... 9 
POINT III. 
THE MINERAL INTERESTS AND LEASEHOLDS 
AWARDED TO PLAINTIFF REQUIRED A WRITING 
UNDER THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS ............................. 13 
POINT IV. 
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 
THE JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF ............. 16 
CONCLUSION .... ··-···-··············-·····--·---------·············--···---·-·----------·---22 
CASES CITED 
Cavanaugh v. Salisbury, 22 Ut. 465, 63 P. 39 (1900) ............... 21 
Chase v. Morgan, 9 Utah 2d 125, 339 P.2d 1019 (1959) ··--·-···-·····-15 
Citizens Casualty Company of New York v. Hackett, 17 Utah 
2d 304, 410 P.2d 767 .............. --··············-···-----------··········-----··· 12 
Enyeart v. Board of Supervisors, 427 P.2d 509 (Calif. 1967) ____ 14 
Guthiel v. Gilmer, 23 Ut. 84, 63 P. 817 (1901) ---···········--···········-21 
Judy v. Lentz, 149 N.W. 2d 478 (Mich. 1967) ........................ 13 
Kesler v. Casebolt, 278 S.W. 2d 325 (Tex. 1954) _____________ ...... 14 
Oil Shale Corporation v. Larson, 438 P.2d 540 (Utah 1968)...... 8 
Peterson v. Armstrong, 24 Utah 96, 66 P. 767 (1901) ................ 21 
Reliance National Life Insurance Company v. Hansen, 15 
Utah 2d 400, 393 P. 2d 793 ( 1964) .................................... 11 
Rumsey v. Salt Lake City, 16 Utah 2d 310, 410 P. 2d 205 
( 1965) ···········-·································-··············-·······-----····-----------12 
United States of America v. An Article of Drug, Etc., 
207 F. Supp. 758 (D. N.J. 1962). ------·-············--------·--------12 
Wiggins v. City of Philadelphia, 331 F.2d 521 (3d Cir. 1964) .... 12 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATUTES CITED 
Utah Code Annotated (1953) 
Sections: 
25-5-1 ---------- ----------- --------- ---------------- ----------------------------------- 15 
25-5-4 -- --- ---- -------- ----- ------- --- -- ------------ -- ------- -- ------- -- ----- ----- ------ 13 
48-1-6 ( 1) --------------------------------------------------------- ----------------- 20 
48-1-6 (2) -------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ 21 
48-1-7 ------------------ --. -------- ----------------- ------- ---------------------------- 20 
48-1-22(2) (b) ----------- -- -------- --------- ------------------------ ------- 18 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 16 __________________________________ 10, 12 
TEXTS CITED 
McCormick on Evidence 
Section 217 --------------------------------------------------- ____________________________ 7, 8 
Section 220 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 8 
1 Rowley on Partnership (2d Ed.) 561__ ___ ----------------------------- 18 
Williams and Meyers, Oil and Gas Law, Volume 1, Sec. 214_____ 15 
ANNOTATIONS 
4 Oil and Gas Reporter, 138L_______ ____ ______ ___ _____ ____________ _________ 14 
26 Oil and Gas Reporter, 625 ------------------------------------- __________________ 14 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
.J 1~ROME B. GUIN AND, 
Plaintiff-Re:->pundent, 
-vs.-
p AUL 'J'. W AL'J'ON and 'J'HOMAS Case No. 11153 




STATEMEN'l' OF 'J'HE KIND OF CASE 
Respondent initiated this action claiming by a writ-
ten instrument dated January 2, 1962 an interest in oil 
and gas lea::H"S and other property owned by Walton-
Kearns, a partnership, and for an accounting. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COUR'L' 
The action was tried to the court without a jury. The 
writing sued upon by plaintiff was held unenforceable 
because of its being vagne-, not :mfficiently definite and 
not supported by any consideration (R. 46). Plaintiff 
was granted a 3% sale~ commission and an accounting. 
On a theory not disclosed by the pleadings or pretrial 
order and independent of the writing sued upon, plaintiff 
was declared to be the owner of 10% of the interest held 
by the partnership in all least>s and mineral interests as 
of May 31, 1965, the date upon which he terminated his 
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employment with \Valton-Kearm;. An accounting was 
ordered with rderenCl' to such holdings and for such 
of the interests as might have been sold since the last 
mentioned date. Appellant's motion for a new trial was 
overruled and denied on December 27, 19G7 (R. 61-GG) and 
this appeal ( R. 67 -68) followed. 
RELIEF 80UGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants, hereinafter ref erred to as defendants, 
do not question the ruling to the effect that the instrument 
sued upon by the plaintiff was a nullity and not supported 
by a consideration, nor do they complain of the connnis-
sions awarded plaintiff. In the context of the pleadings, 
the pretrial order and the evidence before the court at 
the time of the last Memorandum Decision (R. 52), the 
judgment giving plaintiff a 10% interest in oil and gas 
leaseholds was a gratuity and not within the issues. This 
court should modify the judgment ac{;ordingly. In the al-
ternative the cause ;;;l10uld be remanded for a new trfal 
with defendants given the 01Jportunity to recast their 
pleadings in the defense of the new theory asserted by 
plaintiff. 
i::;rrATEMJ£N'l1 OF FACTS 
~Walton-Kearns, a co-partner:ship, consisting of Paul 
T. Walton and Thomas F. Kearns, the latter since de-
ceased, was in existence as of N overnber 1, 1955, engaged 
in the business of acquiring and exploiting lands and 
leaseholds for oil, gas and other hydrncarbons and in all 
matters incidental thereto (R. 12). 
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.J l'l'Ullll' B. Oui11a11d, plaintii'f-n·spundPnt, was ern-
pluyeJ by the partm•rship at a salar.v of $600.00 a month 
from N overnber l, 195G through Decembl"r :31, 1957; 
$(j(JO.OU a month from J anuar~· 1, El5~ through Februar~· 
1959 and. $735.UO a month from ~larch 1, 1959 until May 
31, 1905 (R. 13-14). Without obligation so to do (R. 199-
:200), Uuinand continm·d in the employment of the part-
1wnd1ip as a landrnan until his volnntar~· termination 
on May 31, 1905 (R 109-110) ). In 1957 in a conversation 
with Paul T. \V alton, it was understood. that Uuinand 
would rt>n•iv<=' some additional compensation b~· way of a 
:i3 salt•s eomrnission on kasl's sold IJ~· him from April 9 
or that yt>ar ( R. 11 G-117). 
'l'he instnnueut Jat<:•d .January :2, 1962 attached to 
plaintiff's original comvlaint (R. 3) continued to be the 
crux of plaintiff\; aetion and \\·as adopted by reference 
hy paragraph 3 of the amended complaint (R. 9), the 
plaintiff allPging tJ1at by the instrnment he "'became the 
owne1· of an undivided 10/'o iukrPst in the partnership, 
subject to plaintiff's proportionate share of the partner-
ship indebtedness, tlH· value of said interest to be deter-
mined, both as to all as:,wts and liabilities, as of the date 
of h•nnination of plaintiff's Plllplo~·rnent with the part-
nership." 
'l'lH· writing of January 2, 19():2, was admittedly sign-
l~d by the defendants bnt tlwy dPny that it was bargained 
!"or or support(•d by an:• C'onsidt>ration or that it was 
l'Xl'l'llkd aml clvlivvn·d as au indun·111ent to plaintiff to 
n·main in thl' t'llllJloynH·ut of the partuershi1J or for past 
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serviees allegedly rrndered to the partnership by the 
plaintiff. It is contt>nded that the writing of January 2, 
1962 is so vague a::,; to be unrnforceable; that it lacks 
consideration and that it is nothing more than an agre<c'-
rnent to agree i11 die futme (R. 40-44). 
Plaintiff did not contribute any of the capital to 
Walton-Keams and lw could han (1uit at any time; he 
continued to \rnrk for \Yalton-Krnrns after January :2, 
1962 but he "didn't hm·e to" (R 199-200). He was on the 
payroll and reportl•d his income on the normal vV-2 form 
(Bxhibit P-8). He never varticipat(;d in partnership af-
fairs; >vas never fo;ted as a partner of \Valton-Kearns 
and had no \·oice or responsibility in the management of 
the affairs of the partnership ( R. 184). 
'l'he writing of January 2, 1962 (Bxhibit P-3) was 
handed to plaintiff in the office of vValton- Kearns (R. 
183) and was preceded by J<~xhibit D-4. This Exhibit 
shows intPrlirn•ations crm;sed out, written oYer and substi-
tuted for language contained in what is marked as Ex-
hibit B (R. 31) attached to dl•fendants' motion for sum-
mary judgment (R. 27-32). 'l'he interlineations and all of 
the strikeouts and crossovers on Exhibit D-4 are in the 
handwriting of plaintiff (R 180). By comparison, the 
writing dated .January 2, 1962 duplicated verbatim Bx-
hibit D-4, giving effect to the alterations made by plain-
tiff. The L'Volution of the January 2, 1962 writing is clear-
ly and without dispute pointed out hy tlw thn'(' (•xhihits 
attached to <ldenclants' motion for smmnary judgme11t 
(R. 30-32). 
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'l'h<> im.;tnmwnt as 01·igi11ally dralkd (K :31) contem-
plated t\\·u irnportaut as11ecb: (1) that the interest to be 
acc1nired, whakver it might rw, \\·as geared to a time for 
so long as Uuinand, the plaiutifL might devote his un-
divided tii11e and e11ergil'::i to the business of the partner-
ship; (2) that upon termination of the employment for 
any cau::>e whatsol•ver, the interest would be determined 
as of said time and snd1 interPsts as may ltan· theretofore 
been n·stl·d ·would Jwco11w Guinand's separate property; 
and ( :3) that the interest would be subject to the repay-
ment of all capital contributions to Messrs. \Valton and 
KParns. 
The instnm1l'11t as interlim~d by <Juinand, both by 
way of addition and subtraction, takes out the require-
ment of repayment of all capital contributions made by 
Messrs. Walton and Kearns, takes out the words "upon 
dissolution" and the requirement that plaintiff devote his 
undivided time. It is then provided that when Guinand 
termina t(•s his employment, his interest ''in the partner-
ship busim·ss will be detl'nnined and discharged as of said 
time \\·ithout resulting in a dissolution of the partner-
ship." 
'l'he \\'riting of .January :.:'., 1%~ (.1£xhibit P-3) pur-
ports to confinn the ownershiIJ of an nndivided 10% in-
terest in the "partnel'Ship" to inelude and not to be in 
addition to the nn·ions interests from time to time there-
tofore acquired by plaintiff. 'l'he impossibility of plain-
tiff's positio11 in daimi11g to lw a te11a11t iu eo11m1011 
with l't>SlJl'd to au undivided 10'/~ iutl·rPst in the proper-
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ties held by the partnershi]J and yet maintaining the in-
tegrity of the language "without a clit>ssolution of the 
partnership" is a]Jparent. It was early recognized by 
the defendants at least. that the agreement as re-drafted 
by Guinand "die! not mean anything" and that there would 
have to be a. final agreement when and if Guinan<l ever 
terminated his employment (R. 164). 
r:l'he evidenct• is in conflict as to tlw time, place and 
circumstance of the interlineations on Exhibit D-4. De-
fendant vValton testified that Guinand made the inter-
lineations at the latter's desk in the office of vValton-
Kt:•arns (R. 161-Hi4). Guinand te1:1tified that certain of 
the interlineations were made at the dictation of counsel 
and that all of the interlineations were made in counsel's 
office (R. 180-182). Uncontradicted testimony is to the 
effect that Guinand wanted to be a partner, defendant 
Walton 1rnnted Guinand to be a partner but that .Mr. 
Kearns did not agree. Mr. Kearns did not want to open 
up the partnership to another person (R. 156). 
11he findings, etc. and judgment a]Jpealed from re-
tain the concept that the writing dated January 2, 1962 
"is so vague as to be L unenforceable] and is not suffi-
ciently definite as to be construed from its four corners" 
(R. 54) and that the same "is not supported by considm·a-
tion" (R. 54). The trial court misconceived the parol 
evidence rnlt> and this resnltt>d in the gratuities contained 
in tlw judgment ap1wal<><l from. 
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POINT I. 
THE SUB ST ANT IVE ASPECT OF THE P AROL EVI-
DENCE RULE HAS BEEN MISAPPLIED. 
\\'p are vlagiarizing on McCurinick Ull Evidence, 
Sectiom; 213-220 on this subjeet. 
WhPn the trial court n,opened the iustant case for 
fmther evidence addnced at the 8eptember lGth hearing 
it did so over the objections to the t>ffect that no extrinsic 
evidence \Yas admissible with referenee to the January 
:2, 19G2 instrument (H. 150). JlcCormick on Evidence in 
Section 217 calls attention to the rule of Integration which 
makes the written instrnment the sole repository of the 
legal transaction in the sense that the transaction must be 
derived from tlu~ written terms alone. In the instant 
matter the writtl·n transadion \Vas ignored as witnessed 
by the fact that the trial court adhered to its former rul-
ing that thP writing was incapable of interpretation and 
was without consideration. Ont of the belly of the Trojan 
Horse came something entirely unexpected and the sub-
:-:;tantive aspect of the parol evidence rule was entirely 
ignored. If we do not oversimplify the problem, the 
tinestion is whether the parties intended to have the 
terms of their agTet,m<:·nt embraced in the written instru-
lllPnt. lf the writing contains the entire agreement and 
was intended as such, then the process of interpretation 
is one for tlw court and not for the trier of the fact: 
''rl'lw distinctiou betwl·en such interpretative 
l'\'itknce en•n where it co11sists of expressions of 
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tlH>, parties to tlw instnunent, and evidence of snd1 
l'X}Jl'essiom; when offered to be used as a part of 
the contract, deed or other transaction, and hence 
prohibited by the Parol Evidence Rule, is clear. 
The om· tnw of t>vidence eonct•des tlH· su-
premacy of thl'. 'niting and merely seeks to illu-
minate its meaning. The other seeks to displace, 
or annex itself to, the writing." (McConnick 011 
Evidence, Section 217). 
ln the instant matter tlH~ fact that the trial court 
adhered to its pn•vious memoranda and found that the 
January :2, 196:2 ·writing was incapable of interpretation 
and lacked consideration, makes it cn·stal clear that the 
extrinsic evidence admitted and hdd to be persuasive 
was in reality of the Trojan Horse character because it 
neither added to nor detracted from the agreement sued 
upon. It interjected, that is the t)Xtrinsic evidence, a new 
theory and claim. JlcCon11ick 011 h'vidcncc, Section :2:20, 
states in part: 
"The traditional vi PW is that such declarations 
should be rejected because they would be likely 
to lw used not 11wrel>- for thP legitimate purpose of 
ascPrtaining the rneaning of tht• final writing, but 
rather would he used in the substitution for the 
writing. Thus, to supersede the writing by the out-
sidl,, expressions would violate the spirit of tht.· 
Parol Evidem'.P HulP, and would offrnd thl' polic» 
of the statutes requiring wills and conveyancPs 
to he in writing." 
In tlw n·ry rt-·cent case· of Oil Shale Corporatioti v. 
Larson, 438 P.:2d 640 (l~tah 1!1G8) this comt dt>alt with 
the suhjt>e1 ot' tlH· parol evidencP rull>, as U}J}Jlied to an 
acrret.•mc·nt that \\'as "ddicil•nt in tenus that would render 
I::> 
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it rnfon·l·able." Without the citation of authority this 
eourt found that "an agret•ment to agree" was unen-
forc<.c•able. This court also held, as we read the opinion, 
that the contract was unenforceable ''because of lack of 
specificity of terms" and that the parol evidence rule 
did not permit considPration of extrinsic evidence. 
POINT II. 
THE JUDGMENT IS AT VARIANCE WITH THE PLEAD-
INGS AND THE PRETRIAL ORDER. 
The judgment appealed from av·rnrds l)laintiff a 
10% inten:•st in all the leases and mineral interests held 
hy vValton-Kearns as of May 31, 1965 and an accounting 
is ordered to determine the amount owing by defendants 
to plaintiff on the sale of leases or mineral interests held 
by the partnership as of the date last mentioned. The 
accounting is to be based upon the gross sales price. The 
plaintiff is awarded an undivided 10% interest in all 
leases and mineral interests held by the partnership as of 
May 31, 1965 and not sold as of the date of the judgment 
regardless of whether the lease or mineral interest as 
held rPflects any 01\·11ership by 11laintiff (R. 58). 
Paragraph G of the findings indicates that the theory 
of judgment in favor of the plaintiff is taken from "the 
testimony'' of plaintiff and of defendant Walton and 
which kstirnony is characterized as revealing that plain-
tiff frorn .January 2, 19G2 and thereafter until he termi-
nated his Pmployrnent "was the ownPr of a ten percent 
inten~st of the interest ltdd ])y the partnership in all 
ll'asPs and mineral inb:'n·sts whether the same reflected 
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any owuer:::d1ip by tlH· plaintiff or \Y('l'l~ held in the mum' 
or names of the plaintiff or others." (R 54). 
1'he foregoing is contrasted with parngraph 9 of 
the amended com1Jlaint ::rnd particularly the portion there-
of where plaiuti±'!' relates the acccounting to assets held 
by the lmrtnen>hip on January 2, 1%2, "or the cash or 
replacement assets purchased or reeeived from the sale 
or trade of assets held by it on January 2, 1%2, the rela-
tionship of the parties since January 2, 19G2, being that 
of tenants in common in said assets. The interest claimed 
by plaintiff vested in him as to those prnperties held by 
the partnership as of January 2, 1962, on that date, and 
as to those propertie8 acquired after said date, on the 
date of acquisition by the partnership" (R 9-10). 
Paragraph 5 of the amended complaint predicate8 the 
rdief demanded upon the January 2, 19G2 writing (R. 9). 
Also, it ~was stipulated in the pretrial conference and the 
pretrial order so indicates that the plaintiff's action was 
based upon the writing dated January 2, 1962 (R. 40-44). 
No theory of a contract separate and distinct from the 
writing was presented or retServed in the pretrial order. 
rrhe issues of law specified in the pretrial order relate 
solely to the legal consequence and effect of the January 
2, 19G2 writing (R. 41). A8 is customary and appropri-
ate, and in accordance with Rule lG, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the final sentence of the pretrial order speci-
fies: 
Jt is ordered that this pretrial order ma)' be modi-
fied at the trial of the action ur p1·ior theretu to 
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prevent manifest injustice and that this pretrial 
order, as subsequently modified, if such modifi-
cation is made, shall supersede the pleadings here-
in and govern the trial of this action (R. 44). (Em-
phasis added) . 
lt has already been pointed out that the court spe-
cifically held the January 2, 1962 writing to be so vague 
as to be unenforceable and that it was not supported by 
consideration (R. 54). 'l'herefore, plaintiff bases what-
ever he thinks he is entitled to not upon a writing but 
upon his testimony and the testimony of Paul T. Walton. 
The finding (No. G, R. 54) is rather skimpy so far as a 
factual statement is concerned, but we must assume that 
it is intended thereby to set forth a factual basis for 
recovery entirely different from the theory with respect 
to the January 2, 1962 writing propounded by the plain-
tiff in his plPadings and madP a part of the pretrial 
order. 
In the instant case there has been the widest possible 
deviation from the pretrial order, the pleadings supplant-
ed thereby, and the judgment. rrhe new and different 
theory was subsequent to the actual trial of the cause and 
there was no effort to amend either the pleadings or the 
pretrial order. 
In Reliance National Life Insurance Company v. 
Hansen, 15 Utah 2d 400, 393 P.2d 793 (1964) it was held 
that the plaintiff could not interject "at the eleventh 
hour'' findings as to deceit, an issue not covered by the 
pretrial order. 'l'he court stated: 
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"vVe think the is!:iue wa!:i ieed in tlw pretrial 
order, being 'termination for cause,' not resci!:ision 
for fraud. Although the September finding!:i talk-
ed about fraud, it based its judgment on termina-
tion 'for cause,' a conclusion it consistently had 
<'!:i}JOU!:il'd iu S('h·ral pn'\·ions jndgrnents and 
amendments thereto." 
In Rumsey c. ::Juli Lake City, 16 Utah 2d 310, -1:10 
P.2d 205 ( 1905) it was held that the trial court cannot 
deviate from the pretrial order after the trial of the ac-
tion and tliat nnder Rule lii, Utah Rules of CiL:il Proced-
nre, the prl'trial order eannot be rnodifiPcl at tlH' trial 
except to prevent manifest injustice. 
In Citi.zens Casualty C01npany of New York v. Hack-
ett, 17 Utah 2d 304, 410 P.2d 767, the ruling of the trial 
court refusing i!:i;,;ues not covered by the pretrial order 
was sustained obviously on the point that Rule 16 has a 
definite meaning and purpose. The purpose of the defini-
tive pretrial order is stated in United States of America 
v. An Article of Dr·ug, etc., Acnotabs, 207 F. Supp. 758 
(D.N.J. 1962) as follows: 
'"l'he pmpo!:ie of a definitive pretrial order 
is to make specific the legal theories on which each 
party is proceeding and to crystallize and fornrn-
late the issues to be tried. * * * 'rhere was no 
ap]Jlication by claimant to amend the pretrial 
order at any time prior to or during the trial of 
the case, and, at this time, the right to inject a 
ne\v issue must be denied." 
To t11<' S<llll(' dfrd is IVir/,(ji11., r. Cit.If of Philudclphiu, 
331 F.~cl 5~1 (:3d Cir. 1%4) wlH•re the eourt ;:.;tated: 
---
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"'l'o have pvrmitted him to have asserted a 
JH'\\. position by daiming deficiency in design 
\\ oul<l impair tlw dt'ieae:> of tlw prt>trial eon-
f PrencP prnt'edm·p and would ha\·e bet>n rnanifesth· 
unfair to thP City. Th trial jndgP ruled eorrectl)· 
in Pxclnding evidtmce based on such a theory." 
POINT III. 
THE MINERAL INTERESTS AND LEASEHOLDS 
AWARDED TO PLAINTIFF REQUIRED A WRITING UNDER 
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 
Throughout the proceedings the terms "leasehold 
interests," ''overridt>s," "reversionary interests," "work-
ing intPrests" and ''mineral interests" are used by the 
parties as descri1Jtive of various types of interests pre-
mised upon the n::mal oil and gas lease. In Judy u. Lent.z, 
149 N.\V. :2d 478 (Mich. 1967) it was held that an oral 
contract for obtaining certain oil and gas leases for de-
fendants was void under the Statute of Frauds, the agree-
rm~nt not being in writing. 
'l'he Michigan statute cited by the court in Judy 1.i. 
Lentz, supra, is t'omparable to Section 25-5-4, Utah Code 
.Amwtated (1953), which provides in part as follows: 
"ln the following cases every agreement shall 
he void unless such agreement, or some note or 
mPmorandnm thereof, is in writing subscribed by 
the party to be charged therewith: 
* * * 
( 5) Every agreement authorizing or employ-
ing an agent or broker to purchase or sell real 
estate for compensation." 
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r:l'he cm;e of Kesler 'U. Ca::;elJolt, 278 8.vV. 2d 325 
('L'ex. 1954) holding that a LrohTagt~ c:ontrad in obtaining 
and buying designated oil and gas leases was required 
to be in writing under the Statute of Frauds is anno-
tated in 4 Oil and Gas Reporte1, 1381. r:l'he annotator 
stated: 
"As held in the prinC'ipal c:ase, Article 3995a, 
Texas Rev. Civ. Statutes, which was promulgated 
in 1939, requires that a brokerage contract involv-
ing a mineral or oil and gas leasehold interest pro-
viding for a commission must be in writing as a 
prerequisite to enforcing the claim for a commis-
sion. This is but an extension of the Statute of 
Frauds to oil and gas transactions. The defense 
that such an instrument is not in writing is an af-
firmative defense; hence, the burden of asserting 
the defense is on the defendant. Conversely, if 
the defense is not asserted by the defendant, the 
fact that the contract for a commission is oral 
will not preclude recovery thereof." 
In Enyeart u. Board of Sitpervisors, 427 P.2d 509 
(Calif. 1967) it vms held that the word ''land" included 
leasehold estates for the production of gas, petroleum 
and other hydrocarbon substances from beneath the 
surface of the earth and that such was consistent in terms 
of the common law classification in California and tht> 
applicable statutory materials. There is an extensive 
annotation following the Enyeart case in 26 Oil and Gas 
Reporter, 625, on the nature of rights created under oil 
and gas il,asPs. 'l'lil' annotator calls attPntion to the fad 
that in California, m; in other jurisdictions, there was a 
period of uncertainty as to the nature of oil and gas inter-
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esh; in tlw developnH:nt of oil and gas jurisprudence. 
At one stage in the legal history of oil and gas leases, 
separate interests in oil and gas were treated as person-
alty rathe1· than realty. At present, however, interests 
in oil and gas an~ usually heated as interests in real 
property. 
Willimn.-; w1d Meyer.-;, Oil llnd Ga.-; Law, Volume 1, 
Section 214, lists the various classifications of interests 
in oil and gas by states. The 1967 Cumulative Supplement 
cites Cha.-;e v. Morgan, 9 Utah 2d 125, 339P.2d1019 (1959) 
as classifying oil and gas leases as real estate within the 
meaning of the statute governing licensing of real estate 
brokers. In Chase i:. Morgan, the court stated: 
"U ndetached minerals are part of the earth 
and therefore realty." 
Section 25-5-1, Utah Code Annotated (1953) relating 
to the Statute of Frauds as pertains to an estate or inter-
est in real property provides: 
''No estate or interest in real property, other 
than leases for a term not exceeding one year, nor 
any trnst or po\ver over or concerning real prop-
l'I't!· or in an!' rnannPr relating thereto, shall be 
created, granted, assigned, surrendered or de-
clared otherwise than by act or operation of law, 
or by deed or conveyance in writing subscribed 
by the party creating, granting, assigning, sur-
l'Pndering or declaring the same, or by his lawful 
agent, thereunto authorized by writing. 
rrhe applicable Statute of Frauds can be pleaded 
defensinl!r to the claim that the plaintiff has an interest 
created by some oral contract with the defendant Walton. 
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'rhesl' and other matkrn wen~ pointed out lJy dcfendanb' 
motion for ne\v trial 01· in the alternative for amendmenfa 
of judgment and other relief (H. lil-(j;)) whidt motion \\'as 
ovenuled and denied (R 66). 
POINT IV. 
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE 
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF. 
Paragrn1Jh 7 of the findings (IL 54) is tu the d'fed 
that priol' to Jan nary 2, 19G2 the plaintiff had a 5% in-
terest in the partnen;hi1J of Walton-Kearns. 'rhis finding 
is not supported by the evidence. Defendants' answer to 
the amended complaint call~·d attention to an undivided 
3/lOOths ~working interest in favor of vlainhff which was 
confirmed in writing under date of November 1, 1955 
(R. 12-13). Defendants alleged on information and belief 
that plaintiff had succ<~eded to a 2% similar interest 
originally in favor of Honwr H. Hagins. These interests 
are characterized as "carried working" interests. At the 
hearing in September, 19G7, plaintiff disclaimed an,v 
writing co\·ering the alleged 5% interest and disclaimed 
any assignment from Hagins (R. 192)). The claim of a 
5% interest is therefore based upon "conversation" with 
defendant Walton (H. 192) and this we contend to be 
wholly insufficient. 
Finding No. Ii (H. G4) finds plaintiff to lw tlw 
owner "of a ti~n per cent interest of the interest held 
by tlw partrn·rshi p" in all leas<•s and mineral interests 
and that s1wh is basc•d npon th<> kstimony of the plaintiff 
and of tlH· defendant Walton. F'inding No. G states that 
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the tPstiinonv "reveals'' the interest no\v claimed by . . 
plaintiff and whid1 is carried forward into the judgment. 
The word "reyeals" is a :mhth-' expression and gives little 
assistance as a determination of f(lct. In any event, the 
reYeiation mnst concern itself with a contractual situa-
tion separate and apart from the January 2, 1962 writing 
because in Findings 4 and 5 the comt fonnd that >vriting 
to be unenforceable. 
Whatever the ::;C'l'ivener had in mind as having heen 
"revealed" by the testimony at the 8eptember 1967 hear-
i11g, the fact of the matter is that the testimony was dir-
<:>cted solely to the intention of the parties as related to 
the January 2, 1962 writing, and nev<:>r in express terms 
to a search for a st>parate verbal promise. Counsel re-
f <:>rring to J£xhihi t D-4 put answ<:>rs in the mouth of de-
fendant Walton: 
"Q. Your testimony today is that after this meet-
ing in Mr. Gustin's office Mr. Guinand 
brought 'Exhibit D-4,' the one you have in 
your hand, hack to his office, made the 
~·hanges. and hronght it to you and said, 'This 
is what I want.' Is that your testimonyf 
A. 'l'hat is generally it, yes. 
Q. You said it is all right with you and go down 
and talk it over with Harley~ 
A. 1 said, 'Yon will haw to clear it with 
HarleY.' I didn't say it was all right with me. 
I said·, 'If it is all rig·ht ·with Harley, it is all 
right with me.'" (R. 162). 
Not onh- clot's thP conCl'lJt of a different contract 
u ffrrnl against the parol p\·idence rnle bnt the so-called 
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different eontrad is as vulul'rnble to thP ddensl' of 110 
consideration as is the writing of January 2, 1962. 'l1he 
findings do not attempt to suvport the ::>o-ealled 10 <;o 
agreement that i::; said io havl' bel~ll "revealed" by the 
"testimony'' of plaintifi and defendaut Walton by a 
stated eonsiderati(\11 and there i::; none ::;lwwn by the 
record. 
The eOIH.:l:pt of tc1wucy ill Jmrt1u'rshi11 preelude::; au 
a::;signrnent in ::>pecifie partnership propert~· except in 
connection with tlw a::;::;ignrnent of right::; of all tlw 
parties in the ::;ame protwdy. 'l'hi::; i::; reiterakd in the 
Uniform Partnershiv Act, Seetion -±8-1-22 (2) (b), Utah 
Code Annotated ( 1953). The philoso1)hy of the rule is 
stated in 1 Rowley 011 Purtncrship (2d Ed.) at iiage 5lil 
to the effect that all a partrn·r has, subject to his power 
of indi\·idual di::o1)ositio11, and all that is subjeet to the 
claims of hi::o separate ereditorn, i::o hi::o interest, not in 
specific partnership property, but in the vartnership it-
self. '11lie partnership prn1wrty is kept intact for imrt-
nership imrposes aud creditors. The statutory incident:-; 
of the partrn:n:;hip eo-knanc.\· are attached thereto for 
that purpm;e, "whicl1 will be }JUJ tw1to thwarted as effect 
is given to an attempted disposition of a partiwr's intt•rest 
in specifie partrn•rship prnperty. '11hl· aim of the ::otatute 
is to rn·ev\'nt snch an assigmrn·nt. 'rhl· only way, therefore, 
to app]~- it aeC'onling- to its plain purpose is to nullify 
all atternJ1ts at such assigmuents." 
J-fowley 1n1 Purt111't.'J1ijJ, supnt, m the same section 
and at thl· sallll' pagl' ill rnaking U1e positive statl>ment 
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that no imrtnl'l' has thP right or power to dispose of or 
to apvl:- vartnPrshi11 prnp('l't:- for his own use or indi-
,·idnal ht•ndit without the rnnsPnt of his eo-partners 
mab~s the following statement: 
"He does not ltavP the vower of disposal; he 
has no proportionate share since his interest in the 
partnership is his sharp of the JH"ofits and surplus, 
and the natnre of a partner's lien which requires 
that partnership propert:- be finally applied in 
discharge of tlw debt:-o and liabilities of the com-
1110n bnsines:-o prt>vents it. This applies also to use 
of the firm funds and to payments of money be-
longing to it. "l1he title to partnership property 
is not in the individual members of the firm so 
that either may assign or tram;fer to another an 
undivided share in an:- specifie articles, but it is in 
the firm as an entirety, subject to the right of the 
partners to have it ap1Jlied to the payment of the 
debts of tlw firm and the equities of the 1mrtners.' 
No single parhwr ean transfer an undivided inter-
Pst in an:· iiartieular ]Jieee of firm property." 
'L1he tenancy in partrn~rship doctrine is especially 
applicable to 'l'hornas F. Kearns not only during his life-
time but also after his death. Tn the instant record the 
onl:- time that Mr. Kearns eonsented to anything and 
tlw only t>\'idence of eonst>nt on his part is the writing of 
.January 2~ 19G2. 'l'lw \\Titing was cast aside by the trial 
eourt and the jndgrnPnt now in favor of the plaintiff is 
based on tht> tt•stimony of deft>ndant \\Talton and of the 
plaintiff. Nowllen' in tlH~ n·eord d0<:~s defendant Walton 
puqJOrt to s1wak for his lJartner 'l'hornas :E'. Kearm; 
wl10sP death was noted by the pretrial order and the 
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J~xec11tor, \\' alk('}' Baiik ,\: 'l'rnst Corn pan.'·, snl)stitutt>d 
in his st<·ad (IL +:3--1-±.) J>Jaintiff is t<mfrnntecl with tlw 
additional bmd<·11 of showing s11eeific authority on the 
iiart of Paul T. \Yultun to t01rn11it tlw imrtrn·rsltip inkr-
<'8t, which autll()rit\ 11 ould lHtv<· to <·omc· frorn tlte co-
partn\'l' Tl10rnas l•'. K.<·arns. Nc·etio11 ±8-1-7, Utah Code 
~1wwtatl'd ( L95>l) prnvid<·s in Jiart a;-; follows: 
"\Vla~re titk to real prnp<·rt.\· is in the 11a11H· 
of om· or more but not all of t}H· pal"trn·rs, and th<' 
n·cord doe;-; not disclose· th<' right of the partner-
ship, th<' parbwrs in 11·ltosP 11aJllP th<• title stanch; 
ma:-· conn·.'· titl<' to ;-;ndt prnp<'rty, but tlu_, partnt>r-
shi1J may reeo\·pr snel1 prnperty, if the partners' 
act doPs not bind tl1e partnPrshi p under the pro-
visions of Nedio11 48-1-0(1) ~·**." 
~t>ction -18-1-!i( 1) n•frrn·d tu abo\·<· provides: 
"(l) 1£\·ery partne1· is an agent of the part-
m~rshi p for the purpo:w of its lnrniness, and tltt' 
act of ever:< parhwr, inelmling the ext>c11tion ill 
t}ip partnl'l"8hip llalll<' of an.'· instnu11e11t for aIJ-
parentJ.'; carr:-·!11g mi i11 tlw nsual ,,.a.'· the busint>ss 
of tlw 1mrtnt>rslti p of which he i:o a member, hinds 
tl!P partn<->rship, u11le:-:-: the partner so adi11g has 
in fact no autlwrit.'· to act for the partnership iu 
tlw particular rnatt<->r and tll<' 1wrson with ·whom 
ltv is dealing has kno\\'lvdgc of tit<' fact that hP has 
no such authority." 
It \\'a;-; <·stablish<·d at all <•tul.\ dat<~ in thi:o jurisdiction 
that a piaintiH who;-;<· adim1 is ha:oed upon a transaction 
\\·ith an indi,·idllal part11n, ,,·ltieh transaction is not 
"ealT\·ino· 011 in tlw u;-;1ml \\a\. tlw Jn1;-;i1w:os of tit<• partuPr-• CJ • 
ship" Jia:o th<• )Jttl"ll\'ll of sho\\ i11g th<• partJH'J" \\·it}1 wltolll 
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he has tnrnsach·d business has ::;1wcific authority to act 
for the othl'r partner::;. ln Pet<'rso11 c. Arm.strong, 24 Utah 
9(i, ()() P. 7G7 (1901), the court ::;tated: 
"'l'lw law i::; well settled that a partner without 
special authority, ha::; no power to bind the firm 
in any trammetion which is without the ordinary 
or ap1iart>nt ::il'OlW of the partnership bu::;ines::;. 
Of this the plaintiff wa::; hound to take notice, and, 
having entered into a transaction with one partner, 
which wa::; not, a::; dearly ap1Jears from both the 
pleading::; and proof, within ::;uch ::;cope, and having 
brought thi::; ::;nit to e::;tablish liability on the part 
of the otlwr partners, the burden was upon her 
to show either that tht> eontracting partner had 
::;pecial authority, or that tht> transaction was 
afterwards ratifi<.>d b)· the other partners whom 
::;he seeks to hold liable. We are of the opinion 
that the proof diselo::;ed by the record is wholly 
inadt>quak to show either svecial authority or 
ratification." 
~Pe C(tuwauyh 1·. b'ali.slntry, 03 P. 39 (Utah 1900); 
Gitthid c. Gilmer, ()3 P. 817 (Utah 1901). Section 48-1-6 
(2), Utah Code A111wtatcd (1953) similarly provides: 
"(2) An aet of a partner which is not ap-
parently for the carr)·ing on of the business of the 
partnership in tlw nsual way does not bind the 
partnership, unless anthorizPd b.v the other part-
ners." 
rl'lw findings, and partienlarly Finding No. 0, (R 54.) 
not only fail to :-show that tht> nt>cessary authority had 
h<>en gi\'en h~· the ('o-partnPr 'rlwrna:-s F. Kt>arns but inject 
thL· Plement of uttl"l" eon fusion in tlw statPrnent that plain-
tiff \\·a::; "from at lea::;t January :2, 1902 * ~, * the owner 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
22 
of a kn JWI' (Tnt intt>rvst of tltP int1Tv~t hdd h,\' the part-
nership in all lvasl'S and mim•rnl intPresb whether the 
same reflt>dt>d all.'' 0\1 nc·rship hy the plaintiff or were 
held in the narne or lHiltlPS ot the plaintiff or others." 
'l'he judgment (H. :SS) clouds i11tervsts held in the name 
of Tlwmas F. Kl·ai'lts and others not parties to the 
action b.'· paragraph ;3 and the language "'regardless of 
whether the lea~w or mineral inten•st as hdd reflect::; 
any ownership by plaintiff." 
1£xhibits P-5, P-G and P-7 are examples of the re-
sulting eonfusion of titll', partieularly in the absence of 
some ·writing or other adc•quate authority from 'l'homa::; 
F. Kearns. Plaintiff has failed to earry the burden of 
lJroof necessary to hind the partnership to the purported 
oral conn•yanee said to have been committed by Paul 'l'. 
Walton in favor of the plaintiff. 'l'he record does not di::;-
close that Thomas F. Kearns ever consented to the tran::;-
action, or ratified or otht>rwise authorized it. '11he trans-
aetion was not one in the· ordinary com·sp of partnership 
business. 
r:l'his eourt should n•verse for the reason alone that 
there is no sufficient e\'idenee to support paragraphs 6 
and 7 of the findings or paragraph :2 of the conclusions 
or the jwlguwnt 1vitlt n·s1Ject to the allt'ged interest. 
CONCLUSION 
'l'hP incon~istuncy lwt\YePn tlw jndg-uwnt as entered 
011 Non·rnlH'r J, 1 !Hi7 and t1w trial eourt's llH'lllOrandmu 
deeisiou oi' ~epkrnfwr rn, l!J(i/, 11·itl10nt any intervening 
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hiparty <lisellssion, analysis or eourt sandion of record 
lr>a v<>s tlw t>nti rt' proet>t>ding vlllnerable to serious and 
hasie <1 llestions of judieial regularity. By this we mean 
that the end [Joint arrind at hy the trial judge cannot be 
rntionalizt>d from th<' n•tord or hy an)· aeet>pted standard 
of jndieial proeeeding. These matters were pointed out 
by the motion for new trial whieh in turn was IJeremptor-
i ly denied (B. GG). The judgment as entered by the lower 
c~onrt has no rPlationshiv to the pleadings or to the pre-
trial ordl'r. On tlw fate of things, the judgment appealed 
from is not the result but is the Pxact opposite of due 
process. 'J'he cause should be remanded with such direc-
tions as to this court may seem proper and if a new 
theory is to be advanct>d, the parties should be permitted 
to n~cast their pk,adings in the as::;ertion and defense 
thereof. 
Uespectfully submitted, 
HARL.BJY w. GUtrrrN 
()f counsel for Defendant-Appell(lllf 
P·aul T. Walton dba Walton-Kearns 
J. WENDELL BAYLES 
Of Counsel for Walker Bank & 
Trust Company as Execidor of the 
Estate of Thornas F. Kearn:::;, 
Decea:::;ed. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
